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Documents

November 30, 1967

Guidelines for the Czechoslovak Delegation attending the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1967

The final instructions for the Czechoslovak delegation en route to Geneva for the ENDC in November 1967.  The treaty was mostly finished by this time; only the final details remained. Denunciation of US foreign policy and prevention of West Germany’s nuclear weapon acquisition reappear in these instructions.

May 1963

Undated, untitled memorandum on Soviet-US Negotiations for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

An undated memorandum, produced most likely in the late spring of 1963 (most likely in May) that outlines Soviet thinking on the most recent discussions with US representatives on the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. The memorandum is crystal clear that the key goal for Soviet negotiators was to avoid West German control over nuclear weapons. This is why Moscow opposed the idea of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. However, Soviet officials also admitted that it was better to agree to a treaty that did not explicitly prohibit a multilateral nuclear force as long as their US counterparts committed not to let West German authorities have an authoritative role in authorizing nuclear-weapon use

March 6, 1962

Resolution of the 186th Meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia of March 6, 1962, 'Preparation of Czechoslovak Delegation and Proposal to be Sent to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament'

A record of the conclusions of the 186th meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which met on March 6, 1962.  The attachment includes the initial instructions for the Czechoslovak delegations to the first meeting of ENDC. The document testifies to the strong preoccupation with West Germany’s re-armament, and the possibility of West Germany nuclear-weapon acquisition. Czechoslovakia travelled to Geneva with a goal of avoiding this outcome at any cost. Although the document offers a broad overview of the “lay of the land” ahead of the first meeting of ENDC, it is the focus on West Germany that is the most obvious here

July 10, 1969

Cable No. 2124, Ambassador Shimoda to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 'Issues concerning the Signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Opinion Statement)

Ambassador Shimoda cautions that Japan's signing of the NPT still "requires further consideration from a long-term perspective."

April 9, 1968

Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party

Brezhnev discusses negotiations with the United States over the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

November 26, 1969

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 15293, 'NPT – Text of FRG Note on NPT Signature'

This telegram detailed the conditions under which the West German's would ratify the NPT, which depended on the results of EURATOM-IAEA safeguards negotiations.

November 28, 1969

State Department Telegram 199360 to US Embassy Bonn, 'FRG and Swiss NPT Signatures'

On 28 November 1969, West German Ambassador to the United States Rolf Pauls signed the NPT at the State Department and delivered a statement and a detailed note. At the signing Secretary Rogers spoke about the treaty’s value, the “historic” importance of the West German signature, the U.S. understanding that the UN Charter “confers no right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany,” and a reaffirmation of U.S. security guarantees to NATO and the Federal Republic.

November 5, 1969

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Ambassador Helmut Roth, 'US-FRG Consultations on NPT,' with memorandum attached

During these consultations on the NPT, the chief West German official, Helmut Roth, Chief of the Foreign Office’s Disarmament Section, reviewed the progress of the talks with Secretary of State Rogers. Roth emphasized the importance of the “reaffirmation” of US security commitments “at a time when [the Federal Republic] was signing a renunciation of nuclear weapons for its own defense.”

January 23, 1968

US Embassy Bonn Telegram 7557 to State Department, 'FRG Defense Council Meeting on NPT'

This telegram detailed an FRG Defense Council Meeting on the NPT. While recognizing that the agreement on Article III was “progress,” Kiesinger continued to criticize the treaty’s “inflexibility,” which he saw as a danger to West Germany’s “longer term” security interests. Kiesinger, however, professed willingness to consider signing the Treaty, even to be an early signer, if Washington could comply with a few basic “requests,” such as “safeguards against Soviet pressure” and some improvements in Article III.

May 10, 1967

Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and State Secretary Baron Guttenberg, 'German Views on NPT and NATO'

This conversation between Rusk and Baron Guttenberg, a top official on Kiesinger’s staff and the CDU foreign policy spokesperson, demonstrated that accepting Bonn’s suggestions for the NPT draft had not made it more acceptable to the West Germans. Guttenberg emphasized the importance of a limited duration clause and the need for the Soviet Union to make a “counter-concession” in exchange for a West German signature on an NPT.

Pagination